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If an artificial intelligence aims to maximise risk-adjusted return, then
under mild conditions it is disproportionately likely to pick an un-
ethical strategy unless the objective function allows sufficiently for
this risk. Even if the proportion η of available unethical strategies
is small, the probability pU of picking an unethical strategy can be-
come large; indeed unless returns are fat-tailed pU tends to unity as
the strategy space becomes large. We define an Unethical Odds Ra-
tio Upsilon (Υ) that allows us to calculate pU from η, and we derive
a simple formula for the limit of Υ as the strategy space becomes
large. We give an algorithm for estimating Υ and pU in finite cases
and discuss how to deal with infinite strategy spaces. We show how
this principle can be used to help detect unethical strategies and to
estimate η. Finally we sketch some policy implications of this work.
AI Ethics | Artificial Intelligence | Economics | Extreme Value Theory |
Financial Regulation
Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly deployed in com-mercial situations. Consider for example using AI to
set prices of insurance products to be sold to a particular
customer. There are legitimate reasons for setting different
prices for different people, but it may also be profitable to
“game” their psychology or willingness to shop around. The AI
has a vast number of potential strategies to choose from, but
some are unethical — by which we mean, from an economic
point of view, that there is a risk that stakeholders will apply
some penalty, such as fines or boycotts, if they subsequently
understand that such a strategy has been used. Such penalties
can be huge: although these happened too early for an AI
to be involved, the penalties levied on Banks for misconduct
are currently estimated to be over $276 billion (see SI). In an
environment in which decisions are increasingly made with-
out human intervention, there is therefore a strong incentive
to know under what circumstances AI systems might adopt
unethical strategies. Society and governments are closely en-
gaged in such issues. Principles for ethical use of AI have been
adopted at national (1) and international (2) levels and the
whole area of AI Ethics is one of very considerable activity
(3, 4).
Ideally there would be no unethical strategies in the AI’s
strategy space. But the best that can be achieved may be to
have only a small fraction η of such strategies being unethical.
Unfortunately this runs up against the Unethical Optimization
Principle, which we formulate as follows.
If an AI aims to maximise risk-adjusted return,
then under mild conditions it is disproportionately
likely to pick an unethical strategy unless the objec-
tive function allows sufficiently for this risk.
Problem formulation
The following is a deliberately oversimplified representation
that emphasises certain aspects and ignores others. Consider
an AI that is searching a strategy space S for a strategy s
that maximises the risk-adjusted return for its owners. It
does this by attempting to maximise its estimate of appar-
ent risk-adjusted return function A(s), which we treat as
random because it is based on potentially noisy data — for
example data from existing clients who are themselves taken
from a much larger number of potential clients. However,
unknown to the AI, certain strategies in S would be consid-
ered unethical by stakeholders, who in the future may impose
a penalty for adopting them. Such penalties may be fines,
reparations/compensation or boycotts: what they have in
common from our point of view is that they have a non-zero
risk-adjusted expected cost which we denote by C(s). We will
call the subset of S for which C(s) > 0 “unethical” or Red,
and the complementary subset, for which C(s) = 0, “ethical”
or Green. Hence the true risk-adjusted return T (s) may be
expressed as
T (s) = A(s)− C(s) +Q(s), [1]
where the ‘error’ Q(s) accounts for other differences between
T (s) and A(s) even when C(s) = 0, due to imperfections in
the algorithm’s ability to predict the future accurately.
Let pU = Pr(s∗ ∈ Red) denote the probability that the
chosen strategy s∗ is unethical, and assume there is some
measure on S so that one could in principle compute the
proportion η of S that is Red. The Green strategies comprise
the remaining proportion 1− η of S. Then we can define an
Unethical Odds Ratio, Upsilon, as:
Υ := pU1− pU ÷
η
1− η , [2]
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which represents the increase in odds of choosing an unethical
strategy by using the AI, relative to choosing a strategy at ran-
dom. If η is small, then Υ ≈ 1 will not represent a significant
increase in risk due to use of the AI, whereas if Υ 1 then
the AI acts as a significant unethical amplifier. If regulation
reduces η to 0.05 (or 0.01), for example, having Υ = 10 would
mean pU ≈ 0.35 (or 0.09).
Unless there is a difference in the distribution of T + Q
between the Red and Green regions or the mean returns are
infinite, the expected risk-adjusted returns in Red and Green
satisfy
Es[A | Red] = Es[T +Q | Red] + Es[C | Red]
> Es[T +Q] = Es[A | Green],
where Es[X | Red] means the average value of X for s ∈ Red.
Moreover if C(s) varies within Red, the corresponding
standard deviations will satisfy SD(A | Red) > SD(A | Green).
Thus returns for strategies in Red will have higher means
and variabilities than those in Green. Suppose that the mean
estimated return in Red is ∆ > 0 larger than that in Green,
and that the estimated standard deviation in Red is a factor
1 +γ larger than that in Green. The trade-off between returns
from ethical and unethical strategies will depend on η, ∆ and
γ and on the tail of the distribution of returns.
Asymptotic strategy space. Suppose that the strategy space
S contains S strategies, of which m = ηS are unethical and
n = (1− η)S are ethical. Let MR and MG respectively denote
the maximum returns for strategies in Red and Green. In
many cases the maximum Mn of a random sample of size n
from a distribution F can be renormalized using sequences
{an} > 0 and {bn} ⊂ R in order that (Mn − bn)/an converges
as n→∞ to a limiting random variableX having a generalized
extreme-value distribution. This distribution has a tail index
parameter ξ that controls the weight of its right-hand tail,
with increasing ξ corresponding to fatter tails; it includes
the Gumbel distribution exp{− exp(−x)} as a special case for
ξ = 0. Following the discussion above, we can writeMR = ∆+
(1+γ)Mm andMG = Mn, whereMm andMn are respectively
the maxima of m and n mutually independent variables from
F , and we suppose that (Mm − bm)/am and (Mn − bn)/an
converge to variables X and Y , which are independent and
have the same generalized extreme-value distribution. In the
Supporting Information we obtain general expressions for the
limiting probability pU under mild conditions, and compute
pU and Υ for some special cases:
• if F is Gaussian, then the limiting variables X and Y are
Gumbel, and Υ→∞ if ∆, γ or both are positive;
• if F is lognormal or exponential, then the limiting vari-
ables X and Y are Gumbel and Υ→∞ if γ > 0;
• if F is Pareto, i.e., F (x) = 1− x−ν for x > 1 and ν > 0,
then X and Y have Fréchet distributions with tail indexes
ξ = 1/ν, and
lim
S→∞
pU =
η(1 + γ)ν
1− η + η(1 + γ)ν , [3]
which yields
Υ→ Υ∗ = (1 + γ)ν as S →∞; [4]
and
Fig. 1. Dependence of the asymptotic unethical odds ratio Υ∗ on tail index ν and
additional volatility γ.
• if F is Student t with ν degrees of freedom, then the
Pareto limit applies.
The significance of these results is that if the strategy space
is large, then unless the distribution of the returns is fat-tailed,
as in the cases of the Pareto or t distributions, a responsible
regulator or owner should be extremely cautious about allowing
AI systems to operate unsupervised in situations with real
consequences. If the returns are fat-tailed, then Eq. (4) gives
some idea of the risk of using an unethical strategy.
Figure 1 shows how the tail index ν influences Eq. (4) in
the heavy-tailed case. If ν = 7, for example, then Υ∗ ≈ 1.4 for
γ = 0.05 and Υ∗ ≈ 17 for γ = 0.5. For large γ the value of Υ∗
rises rapidly with ν, and it remains small for all ν only when
γ ≈ 0.
Results for finite strategy space. For large but finite S there
is a simple and widely-applicable algorithm to estimate Υ.
Numerical experiments show that its limiting value Υ∗ is
reached quite rapidly for fat-tailed distributions, whereas Υ
grows roughly as logS for Gaussian returns.
Figure 2 shows how the finite-sample unethical odds ratio
Υ depends on S for some special cases. In the Gaussian
case the probabilities approach unity most rapidly when the
volatility is inflated, i.e., γ > 0, and the Unethical Odds
Ratio appears to be ultimately log-linear in logS. In the
case of Student t returns with ν = 12 degrees of freedom, the
probabilities overshoot their asymptotic values when ∆ > 0,
and the asymptote Eq. (4) is approached rather slowly.
Infinite strategy spaces and correlated returns. So far we have
discussed finite strategy spaces in which the returns for each
strategy are independent. For many purposes this may be
enough: if the asymptotic values of Υ and pU are known it may
be irrelevant whether S is 106 or 1026. However there may be
an effective upper bound on S even when S is infinite, if A(s) is
viewed as a stochastic process with state space S. For example,
if there is a metric on S and there are correlations between
neighbouring points. Understanding the best approach in
particular cases will depend on knowing the structure of S
and of A(s), but these are the one part of the system that are
2 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.XXXXXXXXXX Beale et al.
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Fig. 2. Dependence of
probability pU and Uneth-
ical Odds Ratio Υ on size
of strategy space S for
normal distribution (solid)
and t12 distribution (dots)
when η = 0.1: γ = 0.2,
∆ = 0 (black); γ = 0.2,
∆ = 0.5 (red); γ = 0,
∆ = 0.5 (blue). The
grey horizontal lines in
the left-hand panel show
the limiting probabilities
from Eq. (3).
essentially under the control of the AI and therefore the least
imponderable. The more that is known about S and A(s) the
better one can estimate the effective value of S. We discuss
this further in the SI.
Estimating the parameters. The Unethical Optimisation Prin-
ciple can help risk managers and regulators to detect unethical
strategies. Consider a reasonably large sample L ⊂ S. Man-
ually examining L for potential unethical elements may be
prohibitively expensive if this requires human judgement. Sup-
pose however that we rank the elements of L by their values
of A(s) and focus our attention on the subset Lk with the k
largest values of A(s), where k  |L|. We assume that careful
manual inspection can divide this set into Red and Green
elements and write pˆUk = |L ∩ Red|/k. By Eq. (2) we then
have an estimator
ηˆk =
pˆUk
(1− pˆUk )Υ + pˆUk
, [5]
which allows a rough estimate of η given Υ and pˆUk . Perhaps
more importantly, focusing on Lk to find examples of unethical
strategies that might be adopted not only weeds out those
most likely to be used, but will help develop intuition on where
problems might be found. Observing the bulk distribution of
A(s | s ∈ L) gives an idea of overall shape of A(s) and an idea
of ν. To generate reasonably robust estimates of γ and ∆ it
will generally be necessary to do some more manual inspection
of another subset of L to determine Red and Green elements
but this can be relatively small if well targeted. Details are
discussed in the SI.
Implications. Practical advice to the regulators and owners of
AI is to sample the strategy space and observe whether the
returns A(s) have a fat-tailed distribution. If not, then the
“optimal” strategies are likely to be unethical regardless of
the value of η. If, however, the observed return distribution
is fat-tailed, then the tail index ν can be estimated using
standard techniques (5, 6) and η can be estimated as discussed
above. However, it would be unwise to place much faith in the
precision of such estimates: there are so many imponderable
factors that the main point is to avoid sailing close to the
wind. In addition the Principle can be used to help regulators,
compliance staff and others to find problematic strategies that
might be hidden in a large strategy space.
The Principle also suggests that it may be necessary to
re-think the way AI operates in very large strategy spaces, so
that unethical outcomes are explicitly rejected in the optimi-
sation/learning process.
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Supporting Information Appendix (SI)
Recent penalties in Financial Services. The Financial Times listed
(7) the major sets of fines and penalties levied on Western Banks
for various forms of misconduct. There were 11 types of misconduct
and the fines and penalties totaled $276Bn. Penalties (including
compensation) for Payment Protection Insurance totaled $62Bn
and was the second largest category.
Derivation of limiting pU . The extremal types theorem (8, Theo-
rem 1.4.2) implies that in wide generality, the maximum Mn of a
random sample Z1, . . . , Zn with cumulative distribution function
F may be renormalized using sequences {an} > 0 and {bn} ⊂ R
in order that (Mn − bn)/an converges as n → ∞ to a limiting
random variable X having a generalized extreme-value distribu-
tion. A simple sufficient condition for this is that F (x) is twice
continuously differentiable with density f(x) and that the reciprocal
hazard function r(x) = {1−F (x)}/f(x) is such that r′(x) converges
to a constant ξ as x approaches the upper support point x∗ of f .
Then we can take bn = F−1(1 − 1/n), an = r(bn) > 0 and the
distribution of X is
Gξ(x) = exp
{
−(1 + ξx)−1/ξ+
}
, x ∈ R, [6]
where a+ = max(a, 0); setting ξ = 0 gives the Gumbel distribution
G0(x) = exp{− exp(−x)}. The quantity ξ, sometimes called the tail
index, typically satisfies |ξ| < 1/2, with smaller values corresponding
to lighter tails. If ξ < 0, then the limiting density has an upper
support point at −1/ξ, whereas if ξ ≥ 0 then the limiting density
has no finite upper support point, so the limiting random variable
has no upper bound.
This implies that we can write Mn ≈ bn + anX for sufficiently
large n, where the quality of the approximation depends on F ; it
has long been known that the convergence is extremely slow for
Gaussian variables (9). A result of Khintchine (8, Theorem 1.2.3)
implies that if m = ηS and n = (1− η)S for some fixed η ∈ (0, 1),
then as S →∞,
bm − bn
an
→ βη = {η/(1− η)}
ξ − 1
ξ
,
am
an
→ αη =
(
η
1− η
)ξ
,
with βη = log{η/(1− η)} when ξ = 0.
To apply these results, let MG denote the maximum of inde-
pendent random variables Z1, . . . , Zn with common distribution
function F , which represent the returns of ethical, Green, strate-
gies, and suppose that (MG − bn)/an converges in distribution to
a random variable X as n→∞. Let MR denote the maximum of
m independent random variables ∆ + (1 + γ)Z′j representing the
returns of unethical, red, strategies. We suppose that Z′1, . . . , Z′m
is a random sample from F and that ∆ ≥ 0 and γ ≥ 0 quantify
the increase in mean return and in volatility for unethical returns.
We briefly discuss the case where the Zj and Z′j have different
distributions below. Then
MR
D= ∆ + (1 + γ) max(Z′1, . . . , Z′m),
where D= means ‘has the same distribution as’, and as S → ∞,
{(MR − ∆)/(1 + γ) − bm}/am will converge in distribution to a
random variable Y with the same distribution as X.
If m is large enough, then we can write MR ≈ ∆ + (1 + γ)bm +
am(1 + γ)Y , and so the probability that the best return from an
unethical strategy exceeds the best return from a ethical one satisfies
Pr(MR > MG)→ Pr {βη +A(∆, γ, η) + (1 + γ)αηY > X} ,
as S →∞, where A(∆, γ, η) = limS→∞(∆ + γbm)/an depends on
η, ∆, γ and the normalising sequence for F .
We now discuss the behaviour for large S of
∆
an
+ γ bm
an
= ∆
an
+ γ bm
am
am
an
. [7]
• If x∗ <∞, then an → 0 and bm/am →∞, so A(∆, γ, η) =∞.
In this case the distributions of MG and MR become more and
more concentrated for large S, and any advantage for red leads
to it beating green with probability one, in the limit, because
red returns have a higher upper limit than green ones.
• If x∗ = ∞, then an/bn = r(bn)/bn → ξ as n → ∞, so
bm/an = bm/am × am/an → ξ−1αη , which is infinite if ξ = 0.
The behaviour of ∆/an depends on the limit of an = r(bn) as
bn →∞. For example, if F is exponential, then an converges
to a constant, whereas if F is Gaussian, then an → 0. For
exponential maxima, therefore, A(∆, γ, η) is infinite if γ > 0,
but is finite if γ = 0, for any ∆. For Gaussian maxima, ξ = 0
and an → 0, so A(∆, γ, η) =∞ if either of ∆ or γ is positive,
i.e., if there is any systematic advantage for red strategies.
Other limits might appear when ∆ and γ depend on S, but one
would need to consider whether this is realistic; for example, this
might apply if η → 0, i.e., red strategies are a vanishingly small
fraction of all possible ones. This does not seem very realistic, since
presumably any ethical strategy could be tweaked slightly to make
it more profitable but unethical.
Here are the details for the special cases in the main text.
• If F is Gaussian, then we can take bn = (2 logn)1/2 and
an = 1/bn → 0, giving ξ = 0, so βη = log{η/(1 − η)} and
αη = 1. The limiting variables X and Y are Gumbel, and red
will beat green if either ∆ or γ is positive.
• If F is log-Gaussian, then we can take bn = exp{(2 logn)1/2}
and an = bn/(2 logn)1/2, so ξ = 0, βη = log{η/(1− η)} and
αη = 1. The limiting variables X and Y are Gumbel. Here
an →∞ and bm/an →∞, so red always beats green, owing
to its higher volatility.
• If F is exponential, then bn = logn, an = 1 and ξ = 0, so X
and Y are Gumbel, βη = log{η/(1− η)}, αη = 1 and
(∆ + γbm)/an = ∆ + γ logS + γ log η
tends to infinity unless γ = 0: red beats green in the limit
owing to its higher volatility.
• If F is Pareto, then bn = n1/ν , an = bn/ν and ξ = 1/ν, so βη =
ν[{η/(1− η)}1/ν − 1], αη = {η/(1− η)}1/ν and A(∆, γ, η) =
(1+γ)ναη . HereX and Y have Fréchet distributions, exp{−(1+
x/ν)−ν} for x > −ν, and as S →∞, we obtain
Pr(MR > MG) → η(1 + γ)
ν
1− η + η(1 + γ)ν . [8]
Hence Pr(MR > MG) > η for large S if and only if γ > 0. This
calculation also applies to other distributions with Pareto-like
tails, such as the Student t. Inserting Eq. (8) into Eq. (2)
yields Eq. (4).
The discussion above presupposes that the red and green returns
only differ by a location and/or scale shift. If the limiting variables
have the same support but different tail indexes, then the variable
with the higher ξ asymptotically dominates the other: if Y has a
higher tail index than X, then red returns will beat green returns
with probability one for large S.
Estimation. To estimate the distributions for the ethical and unethi-
cal strategies, we suppose that the k sampled strategies with the
highest risk-adjusted returns have been divided into kR unethical
and kG ethical strategies, with respective returns r1, . . . , rkR and
g1, . . . , gkG , and we denote by u the largest sampled return that
is not among these k. In our asymptotic framework the general-
ized Pareto distribution (GPD) (10) provides a suitable probability
model for rj − u and gj − u, i.e., the ‘excess’ returns over u. The
probability density functions for the red and green excesses are
1
τR
(
1 + ξ
rj − u
τR
)−1/ξ−1
+
,
1
τG
(
1 + ξ gi − u
τG
)−1/ξ−1
+
,
for j = 1, . . . , kR and i = 1, . . . , kG. The shape parameter ξ is the
same as in Eq. (6), and τR, τG > 0 are scale parameters. The effect
of changes in both ∆ and γ appears in the ratio τR/τG, which will
be larger than unity if there is an advantage for red returns, whereas
ξ should be the same for red and green subsets. This last property is
helpful: ξ can be hard to estimate from small samples, but inference
for it will be based on all k of the largest returns. The adequacy of
the GPD is readily checked using standard techniques (6, Ch. 4),
4 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.XXXXXXXXXX Beale et al.
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Table 1. Summary results from simulation study with η = 0.1. pU ,
p′U and pˆU , shown as percentages, are respectively the probability
that red beats green, the average estimate of pU based on the top k
values, and the average estimate based on fitting generalized Pareto
distributions to the red and green values. Power (%) is the estimated
power for detecting a difference between the red and green samples.
See text for details.
∆ γ pU p′U pˆU Power
Normal 0 0 10.2 10.0 13.4 5.9
0.5 0 41.4 25.7 47.7 19.3
0 0.2 54.0 20.0 57.5 46.4
0.5 0.2 86.8 38.6 90.3 90.4
t12 0 0 9.8 10.0 12.8 5.2
0.5 0 20.4 21.3 25.4 5.4
0 0.2 33.7 18.3 37.6 20.1
0.5 0.2 50.1 32.1 58.4 33.0
and the parameters can be estimated, and models compared, using
standard likelihood methods (11, Ch. 4).
Having obtained estimates ξˆ, τˆR and τˆG, we estimate pU by
Monte Carlo simulation as follows. We generate standard uniform
variables U∗1 , . . . U∗R and Poisson variables N
∗
1 , . . . , N
∗
R with mean
rkR , all mutually independent. We then compute M∗r = τˆR[{1 −
(U∗r )1/N
∗
r }−ξˆ − 1]/ξˆ, for r = 1, . . . , R, and estimate pU by
pˆU = R−1
R∑
r=1
exp[−rg{1− FˆG(M∗r )}],
where FˆG denotes the fitted cumulative distribution function for
the green exceedances over u, which is generalized Pareto with
parameters ξˆ and τˆG. In the simulations described below we took
R = 105, which reduces variation in pˆU to the third decimal place.
We performed a small simulation experiment to check these ideas.
For different settings with normal and t12 returns, we simulated
10,000 samples, each with S = 104 and η = 0.1. We constructed
each sample by generating Z1, . . . , ZS
iid∼ F , and then made red
returns ∆ + (1 + γ)Z1, . . . ,∆ + (1 + γ)ZSη , with the green returns
being ZSη+1 . . . , ZS . We took the k = 200 largest returns for each
sample, ascertained whether they were red or green, and obtained u,
r1−u, . . . , rkR−u and g1−u, . . . , gkG−u. We then fitted the GPD
to the entire sample of k excesses, and to the red and green excesses
separately, using a common value of ξ; this enabled us to compute
the likelihood ratio statistic for testing whether τR = τG, based on
the k largest returns; the proportion of times this is rejected is the
statistical power for testing the hypothesis τR = τG at a nominal
5% significance level. If the return distributions differ greatly, then
this power should be high. We also computed the empirical value
of pU , based on whether the largest return in each sample was red
or green, which would not be useful in practice, as it would equal
either 0 or 1, based on the single sample available. As estimates
of pU we computed the empirical proportion p′U = kR/k and the
estimate pˆU described above, both of which would be available in
practice.
Table 1 summarises the results of this experiment. The rows with
∆ = γ = 0 show that pU and p′U are both close to the expected value
of 10% when there is no difference between red and green returns,
and the power is close to the anticipated value, 5%. Although
p′U increases when either of ∆ or γ is positive, it generally has a
downward bias, and pˆU appears to provide a better estimate of
pU . On the other hand computations not shown indicate that pˆU
can be highly variable, though taking k = 500 reduces its variance.
The power increases when ∆ or γ is positive, as predicted by the
asymptotic theory; the power shows that when ∆ = 0.5 and γ = 0.2,
for example, a difference between red and green returns can be
detected in around 91% of samples. For the t12 returns, pU and its
estimates again increase, but more modestly, and more for increased
volatility, γ > 0, than for increased mean, ∆ > 0. Again, this
corresponds to the asymptotic theory.
Computation of pU . Let m = Sη and n = S(1− η). It is straightfor-
ward to check that
pU = m
∫
Fn{∆ + (1 + γ)x}f(x)Fm−1(x) dx,
which can be estimated by Monte Carlo simulation as follows:
• generate U1, . . . , UR
iid∼ U(0, 1), then set M∗r = F−1(U1/mr )
for r = 1, . . . , R;
• compute an estimate
p∗1 = R−1
R∑
r=1
F{∆ + (1 + γ)M∗r }n
of pU = Pr(MG ≤MR);
• repeat the steps above, with U∗r replaced by 1−U∗r to give an
estimate p∗2;
• return p∗U = (p
∗
1 + p∗2)/2 as an estimate of pU .
The first step uses inversion to generate maxima M∗r directly from
Fm, the second step averages the exact probabilities Pr(MG < M∗r ),
and the third and fourth steps use antithetic sampling to reduce
the variance of p∗U . With R = 10
5 this gives probabilities accurate
to three decimal places almost instantaneously. The R (12) code
below embodies this.
prob.sim <- function(S, eta, delta, gamma, R=10^5)
{ # F is distribution function and Finv its inverse
n <- (1-eta)*S
m <- eta*S
u <- runif(R)
x <- Finv( u^(1/m) )
m1 <- mean( F(delta+(1+gamma)*x)^n )
x <- Finv( (1-u)^(1/m) )
m2 <- mean( F(delta+(1+gamma)*x)^n )
(m1+m2)/2
}
High-precision arithmetic may help in computing p∗U more accurately
for very large S, though its precise value is rarely crucial.
Infinite strategy spaces and correlated returns. As one example of
the kind of approach discussed in the paper, consider the following:
Let C(u, v) denote the copula that determines the dependence
of random variables U and V having uniform marginal distributions.
One standard measure of extremal dependence is (13)
χ(u) = Pr(U > u | V > u) = 1− 2u+ C(u, u)
1− u , 0 < u < 1,
where u ≈ 1 is of most interest in the present context. If χ =
limu→1 χ(u) > 0, then U and V are said to be asymptotically
dependent, with χ = 1 corresponding to total dependence and
χ = 0 to so-called asymptotic independence. The quantity 2 − χ
can be roughly interpreted as the equivalent number of independent
extremes at high levels of (U, V ), so χ = 1 yields one ‘equivalent
independent’ variable, and χ = 0 yields two ‘equivalent independent’
variables. Rank-based estimators for χ(u) from independent data
pairs (u1, v1), . . . , (un, vn) are available for high values of u, e.g.,
u = 0.95. As these are based on the ranks, the marginal distributions
of U and V are irrelevant.
To apply these ideas, suppose that A(s) can be treated as a
stationary process, that there is a measure of distance on S, and
evaluate A(s) on an equi-spaced grid, at s ∈ 0±δ,±2δ, . . ., say. Thus
we can observe the joint properties of A(s) at distances δ, 2δ, 3δ and
so forth, taking U = A(s) and V = A(s+ kδ) for each s in the grid.
If we take all such distinct pairs a distance kδ apart and estimate
χ(0.95) as described above, then we can assess the dependence of
the extremes of the process at lag k, for example by plotting the
estimate χˆk against kδ. This extremogram (14) will equal unity for
k = 0, and should drop to zero as k increases, and thus can be used
to assess the approximate number of equivalent independent values
in S.
To illustrate this, we took S = [0, 1000], created a function A(s)
by linear interpolation between S = 1001 independent Gaussian
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Fig. 3. Four examples of χk for the linear interpolation process described in the text.
The red points show the estimates of χ(0.95) at different lags, and the tick marks
show 95% confidence intervals for individual estimates. The sharp initial decline
shows that local dependence of extrema of A(s) becomes negligible when kδ > 1
or so, as would be expected from the construction of A(s).
variables at s = 0, 1, . . . , 1000, and evaluated A(s) on a grid with
random initial value and δ = 0.1. Figure 3 shows these plots for
four simulated functions. The sampling properties of χk for k large
mimic those for the usual time series correlogram in the presence
of strong dependence and are not good, but the sharp decline near
the origin shows precisely the behaviour we expect; it appears that
extreme values of A(s) would be independent of those for A(s± 2)
or perhaps A(s± 1), as we would anticipate from its construction.
Thus if we sampled S at sites no closer than two units apart, the
corresponding values of A(s) could be taken as independent at
extreme levels.
Although further refinement is certainly feasible, the discussion
above strongly suggests that it should be possible to identify an
approximate number of ‘independent’ extrema in an infinite strategy
space, under assumptions similar to those above, perhaps using a
development of the ideas in Leadbetter (15).
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